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There used to be general agreement about the metaphysical accounts given by Parmenides and
Plato and the relationship between the two. The traditional story is that Parmenides was a
numerical monist, employing an analysis of εἶναι to argue for the conclusion that there is only
one being.1 The story goes on to say that within the Republic Plato accepts a number of
Parmenides' conclusions (that what is knowable is coextensive with that which is, something
eternal, changeless, and not accepting of nonbeing) but that he rejected Parmenides' argument
that from the impossibility of nonbeing numerical monism follows. Only in the Sophist does
Plato recognize that his pluralism require a decisive break from Parmenidean logic; and in that
dialogue he shows how we can say that one thing is not another: they are different.2
During the last several decades, a number of scholars have made the case that this story is to be
revised: neither text nor doxography provide conclusive evidence for ascribing numerical
monism to Parmenides.3 It is Melissus who employs Eleatic argumentation to argue for a unique
being. In positing a multiplicity of beings (Forms) that (in some manner) exclude not being,
Plato is a faithful follower of Parmenides.
Within the Parmenides and Sophist Plato portrays Parmenides as a numerical monist. On this
new account, Plato either misunderstands the fundamental point made in a poem (the whole of
which was presumably available to him) or misrepresents Parmenides' teaching because he
thinks that Parmenides' logic commits him to such a monistic conclusion in spite of himself.4
The present book argues that Plato himself read Parmenides as a pluralist. Palmer suggests that
Zeno's denial of a plurality of beings, presented in the beginning of the dialogues, represents not
a development of Parmenidean thought but a sophistic deformation of it. Palmer takes seriously
the fact that it is through the mouth of Parmenides that we hear many of the raw materials
required for responding to the puzzles to which Parmenidean argumentation can lead. He
suggests that we read the Parmenides, especially the second half, not as an aporetic web of
contradictory conclusions, to be sorted out by Plato's or the reader's metaphysical and logical
innovations, but as an intentional mix of Parmenidean and pseudo-Parmenidean arguments about
being. The Eleatic Visitor of the Sophist is not a true parricide. Rather, Plato portrays him as a
true Eleatic, employing what Plato takes to be truly Parmenidean lines of argumentation to
respond to sophistic pseudo-Eleatic lines of argument which reject the distinction between image
and reality.

Palmer employs two strategies to make his case. First, he closely analyses what Plato actually
says about or attributes to Parmenides in order to show that Plato does not actually attribute the
view that there is only one being to Parmenides as a matter of historical fact: he simply points to
how such a view can be teased out of Parmenides' poem. Second, he employs the Euthydemus
and non-Platonic sources to show that the difficulties concerning predication and appearance that
Plato confronts have their historical source not in Parmenides but in various sophists.
The book is dense, and is packed with close textual and philosophical analysis which ranges
throughout the Platonic corpus, and beyond. Palmer's account rests on a valuable and careful
reading of the end of Republic 5. According to Palmer, Plato reads the goddess as having
recognized three distinct paths: that it is, that it is not, and that it both is and is not. Plato follows
Parmenides in realizing that there is a certain variety of being that is found in the case of the sort
of thing that is knowable: whatever such a thing is, it is in a manner that is both stable and
necessary. The path to knowledge is directed only towards such beings so, if there is such a thing
as knowledge, there are such beings. Palmer emphasizes that for both Plato and Parmenides the
existence of knowledge is a crucial unstated assumption. It is precisely this assumption that is
denied by the lovers of sights and sounds of Republic 5. Palmer identifies these with certain
sophists, especially Hippias and Gorgias, although it is not clear to me that they are to be
understood as theorists at all, as opposed to ordinary people. Palmer identifies Hippias as a main
representative of the lovers of sights and sounds on the basis of a reading of Hippias Major
presented in unpublished lectures by M. Burnyeat. Palmer understands Gorgias' On What-is-Not
as having as its main thesis not "that nothing is or exists simpliciter but that nothing is in the
manner of the philosophers' fundamental entities." (p.70). On this basis, Palmer's Plato
understands Gorgias to be denying the very possibility of knowledge. All that remains to
Gorgias' ontology are sensibles, which are recognized as existent by Palmer's Plato and Palmer's
Plato's Parmenides but are denied the status of being possible object of knowledge. Instead they
are objects of doxa alone.
But how many things are there that can be known? Plato says that there are many; these are the
Forms. Palmer argues that Plato does not regard this as a decisive break with Parmenides.
Palmer's Plato reads the poem in a manner that in key respects parallels that of contemporary
scholars who understand Parmenides as a numerical pluralist.5 (It is not always easy to
distinguish Palmer's arguments that Plato read the poem in a certain manner from his arguments
that the poem is indeed to be read so.)
Palmer faces a major problem: the tradition of reading Parmenides as a numerical monist has its
source, not in anything explicitly said in the fragments of Parmenides' poem but in the writings
of Plato himself. Within the Parmenides, Zeno declares that his book, which argues that
numerical pluralism is self-contradictory, was written to defend Parmenides from those who
argue that Parmenides' hypothesis that one is leads to contradictions (128c-d). Palmer points out
that Zeno never actually says that his book says the same thing as Parmenides and places great
weight on Zeno's confession that the book was written in a youthful eristic spirit. He argues that
Plato presents what he thinks is a more genuinely Parmenidean philosophy in the philosophical
exercises of the second half of the dialogue, which are intended to show Socrates the way to a
more mature pursuit of philosophy. These exercises include arguments which posit a plurality of

beings and are to be taken as more representative of the thought of Parmenides than of the
numerical monism of Zeno.
Within the Parmenides and the Sophist Plato confronts arguments against numerical monism and
the possibility of falsehood. Palmer shows how these have their origin among the sophists who
employ pseudo-Parmenidean fallacies that rest on the dropping of the qualifiers of ei)=nai.
According to Palmer, Republic 5 has already shown how such problems can be resolved by
distinguishing from the path of knowledge the Parmenidean path of doxa, which has as its object
that which both is and is not. But in the later dialogue this distinction is obscured in order to
reexamine the Parmenidean account of being and put it on a firmer theoretical basis.
The puzzles of the Parmenides anticipate the Sophist's rejection of predicational monism in
respect to the Forms. Building on work by Meinwald, Frede, and Schofield, Palmer points out
that Plato recognizes that two divisions cut through the class of all predications: in virtue of the
subject (κατὰ ταυτόν) and not in virtue of the subject, and in relation to the subject (πρὸς ἑαυτῳ̂)
and not in relation to the subject.6 Many of the arguments of the latter half of the Parmenides
turn out to be sound when understood as having dropped the relevant qualifiers. In Palmer's
view, Plato intends these arguments to be expressions of genuinely Parmenidean insights. The
same is true of the Sophist's "miniature re-enactment" of these arguments (p.179), explicitly to
the effect that, in some cases, Forms are to be predicated on each other. Palmer points to the fact
that at 252a the Eleatic Visitor argues that predicational monism must be rejected if either the
theory of the Eleatics or that of the friends of the Forms is to stand, since both must acknowledge
Forms predicated of other Forms (p.180). Palmer concludes that neither, properly understood, is
a predicational monist. The theory of Forms that Socrates proposes has as its basis not
predicational monism but the principle that no Form can have contrary predicates predicated on
it. The innovation of the Sophist is to show that such predicates can indeed have predicated on
them contraries such as motion and rest and likeness and difference. This is due to a new
conception of a complex intelligible reality that Plato comes to realize is contained in a properly
Parmenidean account of being.
Palmer takes seriously Plato's remark that both Xenophanes and Parmenides understood the
cosmos as one. Noting the Parmenidean overtones of the language employed to describe the
cosmos in the Timaeus, Palmer concludes that Plato reads Parmenides B. 8.5-6 as describing the
cosmos in its intelligible aspect. It is not beings in general for which generation and destruction
are denied but the intelligible aspects of those beings.7 Doxa is an account of another aspect of
that same being, more readily accessible to human beings. Plato understands himself to share
with Parmenides a concern with the all-pervasive character of being; Plato's innovative concern
is with the all-pervasive character of difference.
Palmer's approach is to trace lines of influence not by comparing a certain historical position as
we best understand it today with a later philosophical account but to try to uncover how the
earlier philosopher was read by a later philosopher and then to see where and how the later
philosopher responds. Although this approach is innovative in the case of ancient philosophers, it
is, as Palmer says, a matter of common sense (p.13), and it is frequently employed in other areas
of the history of philosophy: consider how medieval philosophers are to be understood as

commenting upon and responding to Aristotle, not as we read him, but as he would have been
read via the commentaries, traditions, and translations current in medieval times.
Palmer presents detailed and convincing readings of some of the most difficult passages in the
Platonic corpus. But much is unclear about the main thesis. What does it mean that Plato
understood Parmenides to be saying such and such? Is it to say that Plato attributes to
Parmenides a complex account of predication as a matter of historical fact, even though such
views are absent from the text of Parmenides' poem? Although he is vague or misleading on this
point, I believe that Palmer would agree that this goes too far. It would be reasonable to argue as
follows: the evidence is clear that Plato holds Parmenides in the highest regard. Plato endorses
the main lines of Parmenides' account of intelligible being. Hence Plato would believe that
obfuscatory arguments that are based on fragments of Parmenides' argument would not have
been endorsed by Parmenides himself. Plato believes that Parmenides' true account must rest on
an account of predication that allows for numerical and predicational pluralism, and that, had he
heard it, Parmenides would have been grateful for such an account as that given by his fellow
Eleatic, the Visitor. This is a more modest claim than to say that Plato attributed to Parmenides
the Sophist's distinctions between modes of predication. We are justified in attributing this sort of
speculative history of philosophy to Plato, since the situation is parallel in the case of Plato's
treatment of his other great intellectual hero, Socrates. In the middle dialogues, Plato attributes
metaphysical and psychological views to Socrates that go well beyond anything that the
historical Socrates could have posssibly expressed. But Plato makes clear that in his view
Socratic ethics must ultimately rest on such philosophical accounts, and he does not think that it
does great conceptual violence to the philosophy of Socrates to present such views as Socrates'
own.
Palmer has found a new angle from which to tell the story of the development of the metaphysics
of the later dialogues. His analyses of Plato's arguments are careful and sober, and his tracing of
their antecedents in Plato's reading of Parmenides is innovative and valuable.
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5. The important exception is that Palmer steers clear of attributing what Curd calls
predicational monism to Plato's Parmenides, that is, the view that if something is x it is only x.
This is so even in Palmer's reading of the Parmenidean line of argument of Republic 5, even
though he thinks that the logical possibility of Parmenidean predicational pluralism is
investigated only in the Parmenides and the Sophist.

6. Palmer finds the distinction explicitly made at Republic 4 436b8-9. This by itself is thin
evidence for Plato's recognition of the distinction, but the true test of Palmer's thesis is the
cogency of the interpretation of the Parmenides which it makes possible. In my view this is a
pass.

7. Palmer therefore denies that Parmenides holds a "two worlds" metaphysics. It is unclear
whether Palmer follows G. Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie 60 (1978), pp.121-39, in denying that Plato's distinguishes between being and
becoming as two separate worlds.

